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[1] 
Abstract 
Within Australia, divisive debates regarding the processing of asylum seekers have 
delivered increasing polarisation rather than convergence on an evidence-based, humane 
approach. In order to investigate the role of motivated reasoning (the idea that our 
judgment is based on our motivations) with respect to attributions of warmth and 
competence, 186 participants indicated the extent to which they accepted false beliefs 
regarding asylum seekers. They read an article rebutting such false beliefs and then 
reported their attitudes towards the author, and the extent to which the author possessed 
warmth and competence traits. They then reported whether they agreed with the 
information in the article before completing a test of recall. Participants who disagreed 
with the article recalled less accurate information and rated authors significantly lower 
on warmth and competence. These findings suggest that motivated reasoning plays an 
important role in the way stereotypes are applied and in the way information is 
processed. 
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The issue of asylum seekers is highly topical in both Australian society and 
elsewhere.  Asylum seekers can be held in detention for many years (Pedersen, Kenny, 
Briskman, & Hoffman, 2008); whilst in detention, there is increased risk of suicide 
(Dudley, 2003) and of developing or exacerbating mental illnesses (Silove, 2002). 
Health services received by asylum seekers within detention are low on resources, 
unhygienic, and in many cases dangerous (Zion, Briskman & Loff, 2009). In fact, the 
Australian Psychological Society has come out strongly against the present system of 
mandatory detention of asylum seekers (APS, 2011).  
Racist practices and discourse surrounding the issue of asylum seekers have 
often been portrayed by those engaging in them as being rational and not motivated by 
prejudice (Augoustinos & Every, 2007). Often so-called evidence used to back up 
claims and bolster the perceived legitimacy and rationality of prejudiced arguments may 
be drawn from widely accepted false beliefs about asylum seekers.  Much research finds 
that prejudiced people are more likely to accept the myths as being true (Pedersen, 
Attwell & Heveli, 2005; Pedersen, Watt & Hansen, 2006; Suhnan, Pedersen & Hartley, 
in press).  These false beliefs, while being factually incorrect, are present in both the 
media and political rhetoric (Pedersen et al, 2006).  
Stereotypic representations of asylum seekers prevalent in government rhetoric 
have characterised them as dishonest, criminal, and opportunistic (Every & 
Augoustinos, 2007). This notion of untrustworthy individuals performing illegal acts 
may contribute to the public perception that asylum seekers are, in some way, a threat to 
Australian society (Hartley & Pedersen, 2007; Schweitzer, Perkoulidis, Krome, Ludlow, 
[3] 
& Ryan, 2005; Suhnan et al., in press). This ‘threat’ is also viewed as jeopardising 
Australian collective identity. For instance, the cultural background of asylum seekers 
has been perceived as incongruent with Australian culture, and therefore is viewed by 
many as threatening (Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller, & Lalonde, 2007; Pedersen, et al., 
2006).   
The Stereotype Content Model posits that when people are stereotyped, two 
primary variables are involved: warmth and competence (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2008). 
Warmth is a construct that describes positive aspects of our social capacities such as 
“good-natured” or “friendly”, while competence describes individual mastery capacities 
such as “skillful” or “intelligent” (Cuddy et al, 2008, p. 65). The Stereotype Content 
Model describes stereotypes as being a combination of differing attributions rather than 
being simply negative or positive (Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002).  Within this model, status 
and competition within a society determine the degree to which we evaluate an 
individual on warmth and competence (Russell & Fiske, 2008). The construct of warmth 
is the continuum on which an individual determines whether another possesses positive 
or negative intent (Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007). For instance a person who is friendly 
or gregarious would be considered warm while a person that did not express any social 
connectedness would be considered cold. In contrast, competence encompasses the 
continuum on which an individual determines another’s ability to achieve goals (Fiske, 
et al., 2007). In a survival context these two variables simply question does this person 
want to harm me and do they have the ability to harm me if they are a threat? Obviously 
the modern day equivalents of these perceptions typically differ in their expression. For 
instance, we may meet a doctor who does not appear to be particularly sociable (low 
[4] 
warmth) but we may assume that this person is very intelligent based on his or her 
profession (high competence). So within modern times a person’s competence may be 
assessed by signifiers of societal success such as their profession. Impecunious people 
are considered low in competence while the wealthy are viewed as highly competent. 
This may be due to the conjecture that societal success arises from an individual’s 
capabilities (Cuddy, Norton & Fiske, 2005). 
 Attributions of warmth and competence have powerful repercussions; for 
instance, research by Harris and Fiske (2006) indicated that when viewing photographs 
of individuals classified as both low in competence and low in warmth, participants 
failed to activate the medial prefrontal cortex. This is an area of the brain associated 
with empathic responses (Balconi, Bortolotti & Gonzaga, 2011). Evidence suggests that 
those attributed with low warmth and competence are dehumanised (Harris & Fiske, 
2006).  
The Stereotype Content Model has been used extensively in order to understand 
race and gender stereotypes; however, in spite of this, it may be questioned whether 
perception of a group member’s status and competition (and subsequent competence and 
warmth) may differ as a result of having strategic benefit from perceiving a group 
member in a certain light. For instance, Kunda and Sinclair (1999) found that when 
participants were motivated to see a person as possessing certain traits, they applied 
stereotypes that were necessary for this, while suppressing stereotypes that would get in 
the way of viewing the person in the desired way. Within an interpersonal context, 
individuals have access to multiple stereotypes derived from race, gender, profession, 
age and so on. This is due to a multitude of cues such as appearance, tone of voice, 
[5] 
general demeanour and the general context in which contact with another is made.   The 
individual may benefit from applying or inhibiting certain stereotypes regarding 
particular people (Kunda & Spencer, 2010). 
Once an opinion has been formed, it can be difficult to modify; incongruent or 
oppositional information can decrease the person’s motivation and capacity to absorb 
and interpret information (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999; Munro & Stansbury, 2009). This 
motivational effect can be a drive to reach a certain supposition or to confirm a belief or 
it can be a tendency to seek out the most correct information in order to form an 
understanding that reflects the perceived reality of the situation (Kunda, 1990). This 
process may be complicated when an individual views the reality of a situation in a 
biased way and therefore seeks to support a false reality or incorrect idea; within this 
process, individuals may remain biased even when they attempt to be objective (Moore, 
Tanlu & Bazerman, 2010).  
The Stereotype Content Model has been applied to research regarding race. For 
instance Arabic stereotypes have been characterised by a low amount of warmth 
combined with a medium amount of competence (Fiske, et al. 2002). Middle-Eastern 
immigrants have been described similarly as “moderate in competence and low in 
warmth” by American participants (Lee & Fiske, 2006, p. 760). 
The strategic application of stereotypes has been documented in relation to 
prejudice against ethno-racial groups. For instance, individuals may act to gather 
information in support of a desired view or to inhibit information that is incongruent 
with a desired view (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999). Sinclair and Kunda (1999) found that 
when students were commended or disparaged by a black professor in evaluations of 
[6] 
their ability in a social skills assessment, students activated positive stereotypes when 
being encouraged such as the doctor stereotype.  However, they inhibited the doctor 
stereotype when they were being negatively evaluated.  When being disparaged by the 
professor they described this professor as being less competent compared to participants 
who were not disparaged.  Within these examples, the content of these stereotypes were 
directed by motivation to maintain self-esteem. Similarly, research indicates that when 
an individual identifies strongly with an in-group, members of the in-group that threaten 
the group identity are judged more severely and more cognitive resources are marshaled 
towards these judgments (Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino & Leemans, 2001). 
Therefore the more motivation one has to preserve group identity the more intense the 
defence of such identity. This has been described by previous research as the “black 
sheep effect” where negative evaluation is directed at an ingroup member when they 
deviate from behaviours aligned with ingroup identity (Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 
1988, p4). Within this effect the derogation of ingroup members is expected to be more 
severe than that directed at outgroup members (Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). The 
extent to which a group member is derogated due to this is related to the extent to which 
a group’s members identify with the group. Therefore it is mediated by how motivated 
an individual is to protect group identity due to the extent to which they link group 
identity to perception of self or self-esteem. 
Just as ingroup identity may be preserved through motivated derogation of those 
that threaten norms, the extent to which prejudice and false beliefs are expressed may be 
mediated by motivation. Previous Australian research finds that giving participants in an 
anti-prejudice intervention accurate information about marginalised groups can both 
[7] 
reduce the reporting of inaccurate information and prejudice (e.g., Pedersen & Barlow, 
2008).  However, other research finds that simply giving people accurate information 
does not work; for example, Nyhan & Reifler, 2010).  The question needs to be asked – 
why not? One possible reason why this may be the case is that those who are resistant to 
the information are not motivated to accept it and therefore do not remember the 
information. 
There is considerable literature supporting the idea that motivational biases 
affect the ways in which individuals seek, process and remember information (for 
reviews, see Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998).  The retrieval of memories is affected by 
our motivation to support certain views. For example, Kunda and Sanitioso (1989) 
found that participants who were told that certain traits were linked to academic 
achievement later stated that they possessed these traits to a greater degree than others. 
Other research indicated that desired memories - those that supported the existence of a 
preferred trait - were more salient or easier to recall (Sanitioso, Fong & Kunda, 1990). 
Those with low self-esteem are more likely to remember information that may be in line 
with their own opinions while others who are higher in self esteem may more readily 
recall incongruent information (Wiersema, Van Harreveld & Van Der Pligt, 2012; 
Wiersema, Van Der Pligt & Van Harreveld, 2010). This illustrates that motivation to 
protect already low self-esteem may sensitise recall of information that may bolster self 
image. Memory appears to work hard in order to confirm concepts when there is 
motivation for this confirmation. 
Gaps in the literature 
[8] 
In short, the literature indicates that motivated reasoning plays an important role 
in the content of stereotypes and the situations in which stereotypes are applied. 
Previous research has focused on the way that exemplars of a social group are viewed 
and how they may be perceived if they breach social norms. For instance, derogation of 
a group is more likely to be accepted by bystanders if it comes from a member of the 
target group (Sutton, Elder & Douglas, 2006). However, our research is concerned with 
the way an individual is societally perceived when they do not belong to the social 
group they are defending. Groups may not always be stereotyped based on ethnicity or 
external characteristics alone. Often they are stereotyped as a result of their shared 
opinion or goal. In the example of asylum seekers they are an extremely diverse group 
of people and yet they are collectively stereotyped; the aspect that they all share is an 
intent to seek asylum within Australia.  In a similar manner, champions of a cause may 
be aligned with the social group they seek to protect by their opinion alone. Research 
indicates that opinion-based group membership is a far better predictor of community 
action than simply looking at the extent to which an individual identifies with a group 
(Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds & Muntele, 2006). The membership of an opinion-based 
group can provide a mutual point of view enabling focussed group action on divisive 
issues (Musgrove & McGarty, 2008). As previously mentioned, the issue of asylum 
seekers within Australia has the tendency to divide people (see Pedersen & Fozdar, 
2010).  
Overview of the present study 
Our research investigates the extent to which motivated reasoning is used in order to 
discount information that an individual may disagree with. Specifically, this study 
[9] 
utilises a newspaper article discounting false beliefs regarding asylum seekers to 
Australia. Our research adds to previous research by using media (a newspaper article) 
that is directly relevant to the group that stereotypes are being formed about.  As noted 
previously, in Australia there is little contact between asylum seekers and the general 
public; thus, much opinion is formed through contact with the media. To the authors’ 
knowledge, this is the first time the Stereotype Content Model has been used with 
respect to participant views rather than referring to the views of a reference group. 
Previously studies have measured stereotype content variables by asking an individual’s 
opinion about how society views a particular group rather than asking the individual for 
their direct opinion (see Cuddy et al, 2009). 
Two hypotheses were put forward.  First, it was expected that participants who 
disagreed with the article would remember less of the article information when 
compared to those who agreed. This is in line with motivated reasoning research (e.g., 
Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989).  Second, it was hypothesised that participants who disagreed 
with the article would rate authors lower on competence and lower on warmth. This is in 
line with research by Kunda & Sinclair (1999) and Russell and Fiske (2008). Warmth 
derogation would be expected because the person is perceived as a threat to valued 
concepts, and competence derogation because it is through questioning the legitimacy of 





Participants were 74 males and 112 females (186 in total). The mean age was 43 
years old (ages ranging from 20-73). They were recruited through the use of SCORED, 
an acronym for Social and Community On-line Research Database. While anyone above 
eighteen living within Australia may become a survey contributor, the majority of 
individuals were highly educated.  Most participants (71.6%) were born in Australia 
followed by the UK or Great Britain (13.7%) following this South Africa (2.7%).  Just 
over half of the sample (53%) reported they supported left-wing politics, with 
approximately one fifth (19%) reporting that they were neither left nor right wing, just 
over one quarter (28%) reporting that they held right wing views.   
Materials 
 Several measures were used within the questionnaire in the order in which they 
were given: false beliefs regarding asylum seekers, warmth and competence attributions, 
as well as memory retention.  
False Beliefs  
 Participants were presented with ten statements; to each statement participants 
indicated their response on a seven point scale where high scores indicated a high level 
of false beliefs.  An example of an item is “Most asylum seekers arrive by boat”; this 
item for instance, while being a commonly held belief within the public is false 
(Parliament of Australia Library, 2011). The present study incorporated the three false 
beliefs used by Pedersen, Attwell and Heveli (2005) into a larger ten item scale 
incorporating more false beliefs based on Suhnan et al (in press). Previous research finds 
satisfactory reliability for these false belief scales (Pedersen et al., 2005; α = .73; 
Suhnan et al, in press; α . 86).  Two items were later removed to increase reliability.  
[11] 
Reliability for the present study was α . 88. See Appendix I for a copy of this new 10-
item scale.   
Warmth and Competence 
 The warmth and competence items assessed the degree to which participants 
perceived that a group possessed these traits. An example of the warmth scale is “How 
sincere is the article author?” and an example of an item on the competence scale is 
“How skillful is the article author?” The warmth and competency scale items were used 
by Cuddy et al (2009); in twenty nations (both collectivist and individualist cultures) it 
has been found to have reliabilities of a = .67-.83 for warmth and a = .67-.85 for 
competency. For the present study, slight alterations to this scale were made; in the 
original scale, items were posed as a question about society. For example, "as viewed by 
society, how warm are members of this group?" (see Cuddy et al, 2009), a possible 
problem with this style of questioning is that those with strong prejudiced views are 
more likely to display a false consensus effect (Watt & Larkin, 2010). Our study was 
concerned with the impressions that participants form rather than what they believe 
others perceive. For this reason questions were posed addressing individuals’ attitudes 
directly. The warmth and competence scales consisted of eight items in total, four 
measuring warmth and four measuring competence. Each item was scored on a five 
point scale to which participants indicated a response between one (not at all) and five 
(extremely) with high scores indicating high warmth or competence. Reliability for the 
present study was α . 78. 
Newspaper Article 
[12] 
 Participants were required to read a newspaper article; this article was originally 
published in the Fremantle Herald with the title Busting Myths (Pedersen & Hoffman, 
2010). The name of the newspaper was, however, altered; the name was changed to The 
Craneview Times (a false newspaper name). This was done so that participants would 
not identify the newspaper title and make subsequent assumptions about the credibility 
or political alignment of the information. To increase the realism of this article, a 
newspaper article emulator was used to maintain the aesthetic structure of a newspaper 
article. A photograph of an asylum seeker boat being escorted was also added in order to 
help the article to appear legitimate. The article was 594 words long and addressed ten 
myths1.     
Agreement with the Author  
After reading the newspaper article, participants indicated to what extent they 
agreed with the information provided. Participants indicated on a five point scale – 
ranging between 1) not at all, and 5) extremely – to what extent they agreed with the 
information presented in the article. Those who indicated that they did not agree (points 
1 and 2, n = 21) formed a ‘disagree’ group, those who indicated a mid-level response 
(point 3, n = 45) formed an ‘ambivalent’ group, and those who indicated agreement with 
the article formed an ‘agree’ group (points 4 and 5, n =115). Before arranging these 
groups, the data from five participants were removed from subsequent analysis. These 
participants indicated that they had previously read the article; therefore, data from these 
participants had the potential for biases in memory and possible identification of the 
author.   
Recall 
[13] 
 The extent to which participants accurately remembered whether information 
was presented in the article was tested through the use of eight items. These items were 
presented in the form of statements to which the participant responded whether these 
concepts appeared in the article. They could respond true, false, or that they were not 
sure. In an explanatory paragraph above this section, participants were informed that 
they were not being tested on whether they believed these statements were true or false, 
but only on whether these ideas appeared in the article. This measure was scored by 
counting the total number of correct responses in order to look at the total amount of 
correctly recalled items for each individual.  Thus, high scores represented accurate 
recall.  Reliability for the present study was α . 71. While reliability was excellent for 
most of the scales, this measure scored lower on reliability than the other measures 
largely because it was a test of recall rather than a scale seeking to measure similar 
variables. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the survey online. They first viewed a page containing 
information about the study. After providing their consent, participants were directed to 
a page that provided a definition of what an asylum seeker is. Following this, the 
participant filled out the false beliefs scale. Following this, participants filled out the 
warmth and competence scales regarding their impression of the author. Participants 
were then asked about the extent to which they agreed with the information provided.  
The final section of the survey allowed participants to display how much they 
could recall about the content of the article. Participants were then provided with space 
[14] 
to make comments about the study in general before finally answering if they had read 
the newspaper article prior to participating in this study.  
Results 
Scale Descriptives 
Table 1 outlines the correlations, means, and standard deviations.  Correct recall 
was significantly correlated with less acceptance of false beliefs, the perception that the 
author was warm and competent, and agreement with the author.  Generally, scores on 
false beliefs were below the midpoint, the average correct recall was 66%, and the 
authors were seen as moderately competent and warm.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Preparing the data 
Before running any inferential analyses, competence and warmth scores were all 
checked for normality. The Shapiro-Wilk statistic identified a significant violation of the 
assumption of normality within all scales (competence p < .001, warmth p < .001). 
Even though ANOVAs in particular are resilient against moderate violations of 
normality, the addition of unequal group size and violated homogeneity of variance 
meant that parametric analysis of variance was deemed inappropriate. Therefore for 
subsequent analyses non-parametric tests were used. False belief scores were also 
checked for normality and they violated this assumption (Shapiro-Wilk, p < .001) 
warranting the use of non-parametrics for these data also. 
Hypothesis 1: participants who disagreed with the article would remember less of 
the speech information when compared to those who agree 
[15] 
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA was applied to three data sets; participants 
who agreed (M = 7.17, SD = 1.12), were ambivalent (M = 5.49, SD = 2.32), or 
disagreed with the author (M = 6.00, SD = 1.64). This indicated that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the disagreeing group (Mean Rank = 66.31), 
the ambivalent group (Mean Rank = 61.99) and the agree group (Mean Rank = 106.86), 
H(corrected for ties) = 31.731, df = 2, N = 181, p < .001, Cohen’s f = .462. Follow-up 
analysis using the Mann-Whitney U test identified that mean recall scores were 
significantly higher in the group that agreed with the information provided (Mean Rank 
= 73.39, n = 115) when compared to the disagree group (Mean Rank = 41.74, n = 21), 
U = 645.50, z = -3.619 (corrected for ties), p < .001, two tailed. This effect can be 
described as medium at r =.31 (see Cohen, 1988). No significant difference was found 
between the disagree group (Mean Rank =35.57, n =21) and the ambivalent group 
(Mean Rank = 32.53, n =45), U= 429.00, z =-.609 (corrected for ties), p=.542, two 
tailed. A small effect of r = .07 was recorded (Cohen, 1988).   
Hypothesis 2. Participants who disagreed with the article would rate authors lower 
on competence and warmth 
A Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was applied in order to examine whether there was a 
significant difference between author competence scores in those who disagreed with 
the author (M = 2.89, SD = 0.81), were ambivalent (M =3.49, SD = 0.55), or agreed 
with the author (M = 4.14, SD = 0.57). This indicated a significant difference between 
the agree group (Mean Rank = 112.19) the ambivalent group (Mean Rank = 63.39) and 
the disagreeing group (Mean Rank = 34.14), H(corrected for ties) = 57.517, df = 2, N 
=181, p < .001, Cohen’s f =.685. A Mann-Whitney U test was subsequently applied in 
[16] 
order to establish whether competence scores differed significantly within the 
ambivalent (n = 45), agree (n = 115) and disagree group (n = 21).  Results identified 
that the agree group had significantly higher competence scores (Mean Rank = 77.10, n 
= 115) compared to the disagree group (Mean Rank = 21.43, n = 21), U=219.00, z =-
6.058 (corrected for ties), p < .001, two tailed. A large effect size of r =.52 was noted. 
A Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was used in order to discern if a significant difference 
between warmth scores in those who disagreed with the author (M = 2.61, SD = 0.80), 
were ambivalent (M = 3.08, SD = 0.60), or agreed with the author (M = 3.83, SD = 
0.61) existed. This indicated a significant difference between the agree group (Mean 
Rank = 113.29) the ambivalent group (Mean Rank = 59.13) and the disagreeing group 
(Mean Rank = 37.21), H (corrected for ties) = 60.495, df = 2, N = 181, p < .001, 
Cohen’s f =.711. Following this a Mann-Whitney U test was used in order to establish 
which variables differed significantly. Results indicated that warmth scores were 
significantly higher in the agree group (Mean Rank = 76.76, n = 115) when compared to 
the disagree group (Mean Rank = 23.29, n =21), U= 258.00, z = -5.766 (corrected for 
ties), p < .001, two tailed. This effect was approaching large at r = .49.  
Discussion 
The aim of this research was to investigate whether the extent to which motivated 
reasoning was used in order to discount information that an individual disagreed with 
and whether the author of the article would be rated as lower on competence and 
warmth.  Both hypotheses were supported and are discussed in full below.  
Finding One: Participants who disagreed with the author remembered less of the 
article information when compared to those who agreed 
[17] 
One possible explanation of these findings may be that prior knowledge of the 
issues presented within the article is responsible for the extent to which some 
participants remembered the information within the article. This argument seems 
dubious because the recall test was purely about whether the concept had just appeared 
in the article (not on the existence of the information in general).  Therefore, it is 
unlikely that any prior knowledge would provide such a powerful effect. This is 
especially the case when it is considered that all participants who had previously read 
the article were excluded from analysis and the information presented goes against the 
grain of mainstream media.  
Thus, it is much more likely that motivated individuals remember more 
information when it supports their own opinions. This finding is in line with Sanitioso, 
et al.  (1990) who found that desired memories were more salient and research by 
Wiersema, Van Harreveld and Van Der Pligt (2012) that indicated that rejection of 
incongruent information may be related to protection of self-esteem. Ambivalent and 
disagreeing participants may not have tried as hard to remember article information, and 
disagreeing participants may also have inhibited information that was not in line with 
their views.  
Our finding that recall of information was lower in participants who disagreed 
with the article information is in line with previous research by Kunda and Sanitioso 
(1989) indicating that memory for desired information is enhanced. However, the 
current findings were not concerned with long term autobiographical memory or 
concept of self; instead, they focused on recall of recent media information. These 
findings provide support for theories of motivated reasoning which describe motivation 
[18] 
as biasing judgment in order to arrive at desired conclusions (Kunda, 1990).  This 
information indicates that when we agree with information motivation to affirm this 
view can increase memory effectiveness to confirm the desired view.  
Finding Two.  Participants who disagreed with the article rated the author lower 
on competence and lower on warmth 
Warmth and competence were significantly lower in the disagree group when 
compared with the agree group. This is in line with motivational stereotyping concepts 
put forward by Kunda & Sinclair (1999) illustrating that variables within stereotypes are 
activated due to our motivation to do so. Our research differs from Kunda and Sinclair’s 
research, however, because it focuses on the activation of stereotypes in order to 
discredit a member of an opinion based group, where it is only difference of opinion that 
separates the derogator from the author rather than demographic features etc. This is an 
important distinction which also encapsulates the way in which broad groups such as 
asylum seekers are homogenized by stereotypes, not based on shared demographics but 
on shared intent or opinion.  
Our finding supports arguments by Kunda and Spencer (2003) that describe the 
traits attributed to others as influenced by the goals of the perceiver.  Our findings are 
also align with the Stereotype Content Model (Cuddy, et al., 2008):  it is expected that 
warmth may vary as a result of the level to which the author threatened the views of the 
participant (warmth is based on competition) competency is based upon the idea of 
status, if no motivation effects were present this should have remained stable across 
agree, ambivalent and disagree groups. However, here there was strategic benefit from 
perceiving an author as incompetent if the participant disagreed with them.  
[19] 
In addition to the lowered warmth and competence attributions found within the 
disagree group, the agree group had significantly higher warmth and competence scores 
compared to the ambivalent group. Therefore when an author shares or supports the 
views of the reader a protective effect is activated. Research by Coull et al (2001) 
provides support for the idea of in-group members being defended against threats to 
group identity. In the present study, it may be that the reader realises that this is a 
controversial issue (threat), identifies the author as a member of the in-group, and 
subsequently views them in a more positive light as a way to combat the threat.   Just as 
research by Harris and Fiske (2006) indicated that those attributed with low competence 
and warmth are dehumanised, perhaps by feeling less empathy for those who oppose 
them individuals are better able to defend their views.   
Limitations/future research  
Further research needs to be applied in order to discern what directs attributions 
of high warmth and competence and whether it is the activation of an empathic response 
that aids this protective reaction. 
Furthermore we acknowledge the quasi-experimental nature of our study.  For 
example, there are other potential reasons why prejudiced people may have felt that the 
authors of the article were incompetent.  For example, the authors of the article were 
said to be from a regional newspaper which may have affected some participants’ view 
of their competence.  This is an interesting topic for future research. 
A further limitation of our study was the over-educated nature of our 
participants.  As many studies have found (e.g., Pedersen & Griffiths, 2012), prejudice 
levels are linked with lower education.  Future research could attempt to replicate the 
[20] 
present study using lower SES participants and then splitting the participants on the 
basis of those attitudes. 
Practical Implications 
These findings provide support for motivated reasoning within day to day 
interaction with the media. The findings indicate that perceptions of warmth and 
competence vary as a result of agreement with information. The findings explain to 
some extent why stereotypes and false beliefs are so pervasive (see Pettigrew, 2011, 
with respect to the persistence of social norms) and a simple increase in cultural 
diversity has been largely unsuccessful in reducing prejudice. For instance, as evidenced 
by our study, participants who agree with a certain point of view or with certain 
information have an increased capacity to recall that information or information that 
supports it.  The concepts described within this article are not common within the 
Australian public media; the media that people predominantly have contact with 
typically perpetuates the threatening nature of asylum seekers (Suhnan et al., in press). 
Therefore, unfortunately within the Australian public, this effect of increased recall for 
information that one agrees with, may work to perpetuate prejudice rather than act 
against it. 
To avoid the lowering of warmth and competence attributes when an author is 
disagreed with; firstly, it may be helpful to display information in a balanced manner (to 
appear as objective as possible) in this way information may not be resisted against so 
strongly. Research by Wiley (2005) indicates that when an argument is presented 
followed by a counterargument, bias for information supporting previous views is 
[21] 
reduced. By presenting information in a factual and balanced manner it may be possible 
to avoid some of the lowering of attributes associated with participant disagreement.  
Secondly, anti-prejudice interventions within the community will be most 
effective if target groups do not already hold strong views towards certain ethnoracial 
groups. For example, if there is going to be an influx of asylum seekers within a 
neighbourhood, it is best to dispel myths about this group before this group actually 
arrives. Indeed, at the time of writing this article a detention centre is opening at 
Northam, Western Australia.  There is a great deal of anxiety in the community about 
this (see Facebook page “no detention centre in Northam”: 
http://www.facebook.com/pages/No-Detention-Centre-In-Northam/148703125174064). 
Giving more accurate and balanced information may reduce the tendency to denigrate a 
group of people; certainly there have been some success in reducing prejudice against 
asylum seekers in educational settings both with a student population (Pedersen, 
Paradies, Hartley, & Dunn, 2011) and in the community with older participants (Hartley, 
Pedersen & Dandy, 2012).   
Furthermore, research indicates that those who are educated on a topic are better 
able to remember arguments both for and against an issue while those with little prior 
education regarding the topic tend to remember information that confirms their previous 
views (Wiley, 2005). A final suggestion in relation to anti-prejudice interventions is that 
they carefully monitor which emotional content is used. As noted previously, Harris and 
Fiske (2006) indicate that dehumanisation may be at play in attributions of low 
competence and warmth. A possible way of combating this is to engage empathy. 
Research by Finlay and Stephan (2000) supports this view indicating that through 
[22] 
eliciting empathy using emotional content, biases against ethnoracial groups can be 
decreased (also see Pedersen, Walker, Paradies, & Guerin, 2011, on this point).  
 Past research finds that prejudice against asylum seekers is largely based on the 
acceptance of myths (e.g., Pedersen et al., 2008) which links with the present study.  
However, giving prejudiced people information just once may not be effective: there are 
many ways in which people can keep their previous (hostile) attitudes like denigration 
of people giving accurate information – which occurred in the present study.  This does 
not mean that correct information should not be given to the Australian community – it 
means that it must be given more often.  People are more likely to accept information if 
it comes from multiple sources.  
In conclusion, in our study motivated reasoning played a major role in the recall 
of accurate article information and the ratings of the authors’ warmth and competence.  
These findings support motivated reasoning theories that regard motivation as being an 
important factor in the degree to which information is remembered, and warmth and 
competence attributes are applied. This research is unique because it deals with 
attributions of warmth and competence upon the sources of media information 
commonly perceived by the general public on an important contemporary issue; 
additionally, it utilises the stereotype content model in a way that specifically addresses 
the views of the individual rather than views of society as a whole. Furthermore, this 
research deals with motivated reasoning in the face an oppositional opinion-based 
group. In this way this research is important because it provides insight into how 
perception of media sources and warmth and competence attributions are based on 
motivation. While future research is needed to investigate this topic further and with 
[23] 
different samples and topics, we hope that this research could be used in order to better 
understand prejudice and resistance to anti-stereotyping information and to subsequently 













Augoustinos, M. & Every, D. (2007). The language of race and prejudice: A discourse of 
denial, reason, and liberal-practical politics. Journal of Language and Social 
Psychology, 26, 123-141. DOI: 10.1177/0261927X07300075  
Balconi, M., Bortolotti, A. & Gonzaga, L. (2011). Emotional face recognition, EMG 
response, and empathic behavior. Neuroscience Research, 71, 251-259. DOI: 
doi.org/10.1016/j.neures.2011.07.1833 
Bliuc, A., McGarty, C., Reynolds, K. & Muntele, D. (2007). Opinion-based group 
membership as a predictor of commitment to political action. European Journal 
of Social Psychology, 37, 19-32. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.334 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (2nd ed.). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 
Coull, A., Yzerbyt, V., Castano, E., Paladino, P., & Leemans, V. (2001). Protecting the 
in-group: Motivated allocation of cognitive resources in the presence of 
threatening in-group members. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 4, 
327-349. DOI: 10.1177/1368430201004004003 
Cuddy, A., Fiske, S. & Glick, P. (2008).Warmth and competence as universal 
dimensions of social perception: The stereotype content model and the bias map. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 61-149. DOI: 10.1016/S0065-
2601(07)00002-0 
Cuddy, A., Fiske, S., Kwan, V., Glick, P ., Demoulin, S., Leyens, J., Bond , M., Croizet, 
J., Ellemers, N., Sleebos,  E., Htun, T ., Kim, H., Maio, G., Perry J., Petkova, K., 
Todorov, V., Rodriguez-Bailon,  R., Morales, E., Moya,  M., Palacios,  M., 
[25] 
Smith, V., Perez, R., Vala, J. & Ziegler R. (2009). Stereotype content model 
across cultures: towards universal similarities and some differences. The British 
Psychological Society, 48, 1-33. DOI: 10.1348/014466608X314935 
Cuddy, A, Fiske, S. & Glick, P. & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype 
content: competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and 
competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878-902.  DOI: 
10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878 
Cuddy, A., Norton, M. & Fiske, S. (2005). This old stereotype: The pervasiveness and 
persistence of the elderly stereotype. Journal of Social Issues, 61, 265-283. 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2005.00405.x 
Dudley, M. (2003). Contradictory Australian national policies on self-harm and suicide: 
The case of asylum seekers in mandatory detention. Australasian Psychiatry, 11, 
102-108. DOI: 10.1046/j.1038-5282.2003.02023.x  
Every, D. & Augoustinos, M. (2007). Constructions of racism in the parliamentary 
debates on asylum seekers. Discourse and Society, 18,411-436. DOI: 
10.1177/0957926507077427 
Finlay, K. & Stephan, W. (2000). Improving intergroup relations: the effects of empathy 
on racial attitudes. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30, 1720-1737.  
DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2000.tb02464.x 
Fiske, S., Cuddy, A., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition: 
Warmth and competence. Trends in cognitive sciences, 11(2), 77-83. 
Fiske, S., Cuddy, A., Glick, P. & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype 
content: competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and 
[26] 
competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878-902.DOI: 
10.1037//0022-3514.82.6.878 
Harris, L., & Fiske, S. (2006). Dehumanizing the lowest of the low: Neuro-imaging 
responses to extreme outgroups. Psychological Science, 17, 847–853. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01793.x 
Hartley, L., & Pedersen, A. (2007).  Asylum seekers: How attributions and emotion 
affect Australians’ views on mandatory detention of ‘the other’.  Australian 
Journal of Psychology, 59(3), 119-131.  DOI: 
10.1080/00049530701449455 
 
Hartley, L.K., Pedersen, A., & Dandy, J. (2012).  Attitudes towards asylum seekers: An 
evaluation of a mature-aged community education programme.  Racial Equality 
Teaching, 30, 34-38.    
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 480-
498. DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 
Kunda, Z, & Sanitioso, R. (1989). Motivated changes in the self-concept. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 272-285. DOI: 10.1016/0022-
1031(89)90023-1 
Kunda, Z. & Sinclair, L. (1999). Motivated reasoning with stereotypes: Activation, 
application, and inhibition. Psychological Inquiry, 10, 12-22 DOI: 
10.1207/s15327965pli1001_2 
Kunda, Z. & Spencer, S. (2010). When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they 
colour judgement? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation 
and application. Psychological Bulletin,129, 522-544. DOI: 10.1037/0033-
2909.129.4.522 
[27] 
Lee, T.  & Fiske, S. (2006). Not an outgroup, not yet an ingroup: Immigrants in the 
stereotype content model. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30, 
751-768. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.06.005 
Louis, W. R., Duck, J., Terry, D. J., Schuller, R., & Lalonde, R. (2007).  Why do citizens 
want to keep refugees out?  Threats, fairness, and hostile norms in the treatment 
of asylum seekers.  European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 53-73. 
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.329  
Marques, J. Yzerbyt, V. & Leyens, J. (1988). The ‘black sheep effect’: Extremity of 
judgements towards ingroup members as a function of group identification. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 18, 1-16. 
Moore, D. A., Tanlu, L. & Bazerman, M. H.(2010). Conflict of interest and the intrusion 
of bias. Judgement and Decision Making, 5, 37-53.  
Munro, G. D. & Stansbury, J. A. (2009). The dark side of self-affirmation: Confirmation 
bias and illusory correlation in response to threatening information. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 1143-1153. DOI: 
10.1177/0146167209337163 
Musgrove, L., & McGarty, C. (2008). Opinion-based group membership as a predictor 
of collective emotional responses and support for pro- and anti-war action. 
Social Psychology, 39(1), 37-47. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-
9335.39.1.37 
Nickerson, R.S. (1998). Confirmation Bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. 
Review of General Psychology, 2,175-220. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1089-
2680.2.2.175. 
[28] 
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2010).  When corrections fail: The persistence of political 
misperceptions.  Political Behavior, 32, 303-330. DOI: 10.1007/s11109-010-
9112-2 
Parliament of Australia Library (2011).  Asylum seekers and refugees: What are the 
facts? Retrieved from 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/BN/sp/AsylumFacts.htm#_Toc280780947 
Pedersen, A., Attwell, J. & Heveli, D. (2005). Prediction of negative attitudes towards 
Australian asylum seekers: false beliefs, nationalism, and self-esteem. Australian 
Journal of Psychology, 57, 148-160. DOI: 
10.1080/00049530500125157 
Pedersen, A., & Barlow, F. (2008).  Theory to social action:  A university based strategy 
targeting prejudice against Aboriginal Australians.  The Australian Psychologist, 
43, 148-159. DOI: 10.1080/00050060802318587 
Pedersen, A., & Fozdar, F. (2010).  Refugee without refuge: Wasim, Phillip Adams, and 
a nation divided. Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 4, 7-18.  DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1375/prp.4.1.7 
Pedersen, A., & Griffiths, B. (2012).  Prejudice and its relationship to socio-
demographic variables over time.  Unpublished document, Murdoch University, 
Western Australia. 
Pedersen, A. & Hoffman, S. (2010, February, 20). Busting Myths. Fremantle Herald, p5. 
Pedersen, A., Kenny, M. A., Briskman, L. & Hoffman, S. (2008). Working with Wasim: 
A convergence of community. The Australian Community Psychologist, 20, 57-
72.  
Pedersen, A., Paradies, Y., Hartley, L. & Dunn (2011).  Bystander anti-prejudice: Cross-
cultural education, links with positivity towards cultural “outgroups” and 
[29] 
preparedness to speak out.  Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 5, 19-30. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1375/prp.5.1.19 
Pedersen, A., Walker, I., Paradies, Y., & Guerin, B. (2011).  How to cook rice:  
Ingredients for teaching anti-prejudice.  The Australian Psychologist, 46, 55-63. 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-9544.2010.00015.x 
Pedersen, A., Watt, S., & Hansen, S. (2006).  The role of false beliefs in the community's 
and the federal government's attitudes toward Australian asylum seekers.  
Australian Journal of Social Issues, 41, 105-124. 
Pettigrew, T.F. (2011).  Toward sustainable psychological interventions for change.  
Peace and Conflict, 17, 179-192.   DOI:  10.1080/10781919.2010.536758 
Russell, A. & Fiske, S. (2008). It’s all relative: competition and status drive 
interpersonal perception. European Journal of Psychology, 38, 1193-1201. 
DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.539 
Sanitioso, R., Kunda, Z. & Fong, G. (1990). Motivated recruitment of autobiographical 
memories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 229-241. DOI: 
10.1037/0022-3514.59.2.229 
Sutton, R., Elder, T., Douglas, K. (2006). Reactions to internal and external criticism of 
outgroups: Social convention in the intergroup sensitivity effect. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 563-575. DOI: 10.1177/0146167205282992 
Schweitzer, R., Greenslade, J., & Kagee, A. (2007).  Coping and resilience in refugees 
from the Sudan:  A narrative account. Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry, 41, 282-288.  DOI:10.1080/00048670601172780 
[30] 
Silove, D. (2002). The asylum debacle in Australia: a challenge for psychiatry. 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 36(3), 290-296. doi: 
10.1046/j.1440-1614.2002.01036.x 
Sinclair, L. & Kunda, Z. (1999). Reactions to black professional: Motivated inhibition 
and activation of conflicting stereotypes. Attitudes and Social Cognition,77, 885-
904. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.77.5.885 
Suhnan, A., Pedersen, A., & Hartley, L.K. (in press).  Prejudice against asylum seekers 
in Australia:  The role of people smugglers, the perception of threat, and 
acceptance of false beliefs.  The Australian Community Psychologist.    
The Australian Psychological Society Limited (2011). Joint Select Committee on 
Australia’s Immigration Detention Network.  The Australian Psychological 
Society Limited: Melbourne, Victoria.   
Watt, S.E & Larkin, C. (2010). Prejudiced people perceive more community support for 
their views: The role of own, media, and peer attitudes in perceived consensus. 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 40, 710-741. DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-
1816.2010.00594.x 
Wiersema, D. V., van Harreveld, F., & van Der Pligt. J. (2012). Shut your eyes and 
think of something else: Self-esteem and avoidance when dealing with counter-
attitudinal information. Social Cognition, 30(3), 323-334. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2012.30.3.323 
 
Wiersema, D. V., van Der Pligt. J.., & van Harreveld, F. (2010). Motivated memory: 
Memory for attitude-relevant information as a function of self-esteem. Social 
Cognition, 28(2), 219-239. DOI: 10.1521/soco.2010.28.2.219 
[31] 
Wiley, J. (2005). A fair and balanced look at the news: what effects memory for 
controversial arguments? Journal of Memory and Language, 53, 95-109. DOI: 
10.1016/j.jml.2005.02.001, 
Zion, D., Briskman, L. and Loff, B. (2009). Nursing in asylum seeker detention in 








Footnote 1.  The names of four article authors preceded the article; one white male, one 
white female, one Arabic male and one Arabic female.  However, as there was no effect, 
we do not include this aspect in the main study but note the results in an effort not to add 
to the ‘file drawer problem’.   
[33] 
 
Table 1.  Correlation matrix and descriptives 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   1  2  3  4  5  Mean/SD  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. False beliefs  1.  -.188*  -.322** -.355** -.555** 3.28(1.33) 
2. Author warmth 1  .388**  .407**  .378**  3.51(0.78) 
3. Author competence      1  .760**  .668**  3.83(0.74) 
4. Author agreement        1  .651**  3.78(1.05) 
5. Correct recall          1.  6.62(1.72) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 




 New False Belief Scale   
 
 
1. Asylum seekers are queue jumpers 
2. There are not that many asylum seekers coming to Australia compared to other 
Western countries 
3. Asylum seekers must be “cashed up” (i.e., be financially well off) to pay people 
smugglers. 
4. Asylum seekers get all sorts of government handouts 
5. Asylum seekers are safe when they arrive in Indonesia or Malaysia, so travelling 
to Australia is unnecessary 
6. Only asylum seekers who apply through the right authorities, such as the UN, 
should be considered genuine 
7. Australia takes less asylum seekers than most other Western countries 
8. Seeking asylum without authorization from Australian authorities (e.g., boat 
people) is illegal under Australian law 
9. Most asylum seekers arrive by boat 
10. Asylum seekers are more likely to be terrorists compared with refugees that 
come through official channels 
11. Giving Temporary Protection Visas, rather than Permanent Protection Visas, will 
not stop asylum seekers coming to Australia by boat. 
 
Likert scale from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. 
After recoding, high scores = high acceptance of false beliefs 
 
Note:  One item (temporary protection visas, rather than permanent protection visas, will 
not stop asylum seekers coming to Australia by boat) was not included in the final scale 
because it lowered reliability.   
 
 
 
 
 
